Dueling Grants: Reimagining CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions by Pierce, Tanya
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 3 Spring 2017 Article 4
5-24-2017
Dueling Grants: Reimagining CAFA’s Jurisdictional
Provisions
Tanya Pierce
Texas A&M University School of Law, tanyapierce@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Jurisdiction
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tanya Pierce, Dueling Grants: Reimagining CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 723 (2017).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/4
  723
DUELING GRANTS: REIMAGINING CAFA’S 
JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Tanya Pierce* 
INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade after Congress passed the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),1 courts continue to disagree as to its 
application and meaning in a variety of situations, many of which 
have wide-ranging effects.2 This article considers a fundamental 
issue that arises after a certification decision is reached: whether a 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA depends on a class 
being certified. Specifically, the article considers what happens when 
a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction derives solely from 
CAFA’s minimal diversity jurisdiction provision and a request for 
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23) 
is denied. The statute’s ambiguity on this point has resulted in 
numerous inefficiencies and opportunities to manipulate jurisdiction.3 
Before introducing the statute’s jurisdictional provisions, it is 
helpful to briefly outline some of the concerns underlying the 
availability of class treatment and motivating CAFA’s passage.4 In 
the right cases, class treatment furthers judicial economy and 
increases efficiency.5 It allows plaintiffs opportunities for recovery 
                                                                                                                 
*I am thankful to the organizers and participants at the works-in-progress sessions at the 2016 Asian 
Pacific Americans: Unity & Diversity, Conference of Asian American Law Faculty and at the 2016 
Texas Legal Scholars Conference. Special thanks to D. Theodore Rave, Margaret Russell, and Shirin 
Sinnar for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. All mistakes are mine. 
 1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) (2011) and other sections of 28 U.S.C.) (authorizing federal courts to hear many alleged 
nationwide state law based class actions in which the aggregate value of the claims exceeds $5 million 
and diversity of citizenship exists between any member of the alleged class and any defendant). 
 2. Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012); Metz v. Unizan 
Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 3. See discussion and citations infra Section III.A.1.d. 
 4. See discussion and citations infra Part I. 
 5. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1599 
(2008). 
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where they might otherwise have none, and it deters wrongdoing that 
might otherwise go unpunished.6 It enables cost sharing and prevents 
duplicative, potentially conflicting judgments.7 While these goals are 
commendable, the class treatment device can also provide 
opportunities for abuse.8 By alleging a class action, plaintiffs can 
transform cases involving little harm into ones that have the ability to 
bankrupt defendants.9 And in some states, courts that routinely 
certified classes became known as “judicial hellholes” that enabled 
“drive by certifications.”10 By providing federal courts jurisdiction 
over the largest of alleged, nationwide class actions, proponents of 
CAFA sought to eliminate the incentives for filing such actions.11 
After all, given the difficulty of meeting Rule 23’s requirements,12 
most alleged classes would fail, and plaintiffs, whose claims could 
not independently exceed the $75,000 threshold for jurisdiction under 
the general diversity statute, would lack the incentive and resources 
to pursue their remaining individual claims.13 
But time has proven not all plaintiffs act reasonably, nor do they 
always act in their own economic interests.14 In addition, while most 
class action plaintiffs would prefer to avoid litigating in federal court, 
it is not completely unheard of for some plaintiffs to seek to litigate 
there.15 Take for example, a plaintiff who alleged he overpaid for a 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 
46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1097, 1104 n.30 (2013); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 735, 735 n.20 (2013). 
 7. Klonoff, supra note 6, at 735. 
 8. Erichson, supra note 5, at 1598–1600. 
 9. See id. at 1601; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old 
and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1855 (2008). 
 10. Purcell, supra note 9, at 1872, 1886 n.249. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1854–55 (2008). 
 11. Purcell, supra note 9, at 1854. 
 12. For discussions of the challenges to certifying a class action in federal courts, see, e.g., Bone, 
supra note 6, at 1098–99, n.3 (describing recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the use of the class 
action device in federal courts (citing Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications 
of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37 (2011))); Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 623, 627, 658 (2012); Klonoff, supra note 6, at 732; Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 708–09, 720, n.85 (2012). 
 13. See Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 14. See discussion and citations infra Part III. 
 15. Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL 1274119, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
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roughly $24.00 diet supplement16 and another who alleged he 
overpaid for a video game.17 These claims, because they were styled 
as nationwide class actions of the kind covered by CAFA, conferred 
subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts until certification in each 
was denied.18 If one were to conclude CAFA jurisdiction always 
continues over individual claims after a class fails, plaintiffs could 
force federal courts to try even the most trivial cases to their ultimate 
conclusions. That is exactly what the plaintiffs in the diet supplement 
and video game cases tried to do, even though the cases could not 
have satisfied the relatively generous jurisdictional requirements to 
be litigated in state courts.19 Unsurprisingly, the federal courts in both 
cases rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to manipulate jurisdiction and 
instead held jurisdiction under CAFA expired when the class actions 
failed.20 
Such a conclusion is not a panacea, however, nor would it 
necessarily result in increased efficiency in every case.21 For 
example, consider a hypothetical plaintiff who files a qualifying 
putative class action in state court. Relying on CAFA’s expansion of 
federal court jurisdiction, defendants remove. After significant time 
and resources are spent, the court rejects class treatment under Rule 
23. If the court retained jurisdiction, an unreasonable plaintiff could 
continue to pursue the case in federal court, but in all likelihood, the 
case would quickly come to an end once class treatment was no 
longer a possibility. If jurisdiction ceased when the certification 
failed, however, the case would be remanded to state court.22 The 
state court could then certify the class under the state’s class action 
rules, which would undermine one of CAFA’s primary goals.23 
CAFA’s provisions then could be read to suggest if a state court 
                                                                                                                 
Mar. 27, 2014); Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 859. 
 16. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119 at *1. 
 17. Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 859. 
 18. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119 at *1; Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 859. 
 19. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119 at *4; Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 859. 
 20. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119 at *2; Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862. 
 21. See discussion and citations infra Part III; see also Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. 
592 F.3d 805, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 22. See Cunningham Charter Corp., 592 F.3d at 806. 
 23. See id. at 807. 
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certified any aspect of the case for class treatment, the defendants 
could again remove the action to federal court, which would have 
authority to revisit certification decisions and the obligation to ensure 
Rule 23’s requirements are met. Decertifying the class, however, 
would again divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction, and 
despite the apparent irrationality, the process could be repeated. 
Recognizing this type of situation could render litigation a game of 
jurisdictional “ping-pong,” the trend in circuit courts is to hold that 
jurisdiction continues after a denial of class certification.24 But not all 
courts agree.25 Likewise, scholars who have analyzed this problem 
have reached opposing determinations.26 This article concludes 
CAFA’s language and statutory scheme require courts to consider 
jurisdiction at two points: before a certification decision is reached 
and after such a decision. While CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions 
clearly provide federal courts with jurisdiction as soon as plaintiffs 
allege the kind of putative class covered by CAFA, some courts 
reason that jurisdiction must continue post denial of certification or it 
must be treated as never having existed from the beginning.27 That 
reasoning is flawed. Despite the potential that cases could move back 
and forth between federal and state courts, given the way CAFA was 
drafted, this article concludes a denial of certification should cause 
jurisdiction to cease, such that dismissal or remand is required. If a 
reasonable possibility exists that a deficiency in the alleged class can 
be fixed, perhaps the class representatives’ claims are not typical of 
the absent class members’ claims,28 for example, courts should delay 
the certification decision and encourage the parties to explain how 
the alleged class might be remedied to allow certification. If the court 
remains unconvinced, however, it should deny certification and 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See discussion infra Part III. 
 25. G. Shaun Richardson, Class Dismissed, Now What? Exploring the Exercise of CAFA 
Jurisdiction After the Denial of Class Certification, 39 N.M. L. REV. 121, 121 (2009). 
 26. Id.; Kevin Lampone, Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA Jurisdiction, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. 1151, 1151–52 (2012). 
 27. Richardson, supra note 25, at 121. 
 28. See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 
58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 855 (2006). 
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dismiss or remand the case, unless an alternative basis for federal 
jurisdiction exists. 
Approaching CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions in this way would 
allow courts to avoid ignoring some of the statute’s more 
problematic, but nevertheless, existing jurisdictional provisions. In 
addition, to the extent possible, it would further the primary 
articulated purposes underlying Congress’s passage of CAFA, 
ensuring, on the one hand, that class actions of national importance 
are heard in federal courts and preventing, on the other hand, de 
minimis or meritless claims that do not further substantive legal 
policies and could never qualify for class treatment from taking up 
limited judicial resources merely because plaintiffs allege a 
qualifying putative class.29 It would also promote predictable and 
logically consistent answers to the question of continuing 
jurisdiction, even though in some cases characteristics of a given 
class weigh in favor of delaying a class certification decisions, 
whereas in others they do not. 
Part I of the article discusses the relevant policies underlying 
CAFA and Rule 23. Part II briefly outlines the more straightforward 
operation of CAFA jurisdiction in pre-certification and post-
successful certification situations before explaining the provisions in 
CAFA that have given rise to considerable confusion after courts 
deny class certification. Part III critiques the arguments made by 
courts and scholars in support of and against continuing jurisdiction. 
It then suggests an approach that is most consistent with the statute, 
in light of all of its relevant provisions and their corresponding 
limitations, and that furthers prudential concerns underlying Rule 23 
and CAFA as much as possible given the way the statute was drafted. 
I. CAFA and Rule 23 
While state courts enjoy broad subject matter jurisdiction, federal 
courts have limited jurisdiction and may hear only the kinds of cases 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2) (2016)); Richardson, supra note 25, at 134. 
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that the Constitution permits and that Congress authorizes.30 
Determining whether a case falls within a court’s jurisdiction is, of 
course, of critical importance because a court’s lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is a fatal defect that cannot be waived.31 Moreover, courts 
and parties do not have the power to create subject matter jurisdiction 
by agreement or by consent.32 Before Congress passed CAFA, 
federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over class actions only if the 
alleged class actions fell within one of the already existing 
jurisdictional statutes,33 and most did not.34 
Through CAFA, Congress amended the federal diversity statute to 
incorporate a minimal diversity requirement that allows federal 
courts to preside over more interstate class actions, even when those 
class actions are based solely on state law claims.35 Now, whenever a 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
 31. See id. Even when federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action, unless 
Congress affirmatively acts to make that jurisdiction exclusive, there exists a “deeply rooted 
presumption in favor of concurrent” state and federal court jurisdiction. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 
459 (1990). Absent “explicit statutory directive,” “unmistakable implication from legislative history,” or 
“clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests,” this presumption governs. 
Id. at 459–60. 
 32. See Mansfield, C & L M Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383 (1884). 
 33. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (2008). For a helpful, detailed explanation of the 
pre-CAFA jurisdictional regime, or “default regime,” that still applies to alleged class actions that are 
not covered by CAFA, see id. at 1450–53. Importantly, prior to CAFA’s passage, federal law lacked any 
provisions “that permitted the removal of overlapping state court class actions that were otherwise not 
removable.” Id. at 1511. 
 34. See id. at 1450–52; see also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional Proof, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 409, 413 (2008); James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the 
Limits of Article III, 95 CA. L. REV. 1423, 1443–44 (2007). 
 35. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) and other sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also, e.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 
1345, 1348 (2013); Burbank, supra note 33, at 1441 (“The scope of putative class actions that, at the end 
of the day, the [CAFA] statute brings within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is very 
broad.”); Pfander, supra note 34, at 1443–44 (“Although CAFA includes few substantive provisions that 
regulate the fairness of class action litigation and settlement, jurisdictional provisions lie at the heart of 
the Act.”); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 779 (2010). Cf. 
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility 
of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 155 (2006) (considering, among other things, 
CAFA’s non-jurisdictional provisions). Minimal diversity exists when the citizenship of any class 
member is diverse from that of any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2016); Lowery v. Ala. Power 
Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1194 n. 24 (7th Cir. 2007). For diversity purposes, a corporation is deemed to be a 
citizen of all of the states in which it is incorporated and of the state in which it has its principle place of 
business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 88 (2010). Under CAFA, unincorporated 
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plaintiff files a putative class action alleging sufficient damages, a 
large enough class, and at least one diverse party, federal courts may 
exercise original jurisdiction to hear the action, unless one of 
CAFA’s narrow statutory exceptions applies.36 CAFA also modified 
federal removal procedures so that any defendant can remove an 
action to federal court, even if not all defendants agree, and it 
eliminated the home-state defendant and one-year limitations on 
removal.37 While CAFA addressed some legitimate problems, it did 
so by adopting jurisdictional provisions that “are detailed, 
complicated and replete with both undefined terms and ambiguous 
phrases.”38 By leaving “some questions implicating forum allocation 
unanswered,” Congress “guaranteed years of work for lawyers and 
courts that is unrelated to the merits of the underlying dispute.”39 The 
question regarding what happens after certification is denied is just 
one of those questions. 
A. Policies Underlying CAFA 
Before CAFA, class plaintiffs, who had the power to transform 
small cases into ones with potentially grave consequences for 
defendants, could fairly readily avoid federal courts by joining a 
named plaintiff who was a citizen of the same state as one of the 
defendants, by suing a defendant who was a citizen of the same state 
as one of the plaintiffs—as long as the joinder was not fraudulent—
or by alleging individual harms that failed to exceed $75,000, 
exclusive of interests and costs.40 Thus, plaintiffs “with state-law 
                                                                                                                 
associations’ citizenship is determined in the same way that citizenship of corporations is determined. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10). While CAFA established a “Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights” that 
limits certain kinds of settlements and increases certain notice requirements, CAFA’s jurisdictional 
provisions are at the “heart” of the statute. See Pfander, supra note 34, at 1443–44. 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(4)–(5), and (d)(9). For example, CAFA contains exceptions, for 
certain kinds of cases dealing with securities under various federal securities laws and for cases relating 
to certain claims concerning the governance of certain types of businesses under laws of states where 
such businesses are incorporated or organized. Hoffman, supra note 34. For a helpful summary of 
CAFA’s exceptions, see id. Hoffman, supra note 34. 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2016). 
 38. Burbank, supra note 33, at 1444. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1451, 1451 n.32 (citing Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of Federal Courts 
189 and Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005)). 
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claims often filed their cases in a relatively small number of pro-
plaintiff state-court jurisdictions.”41 The judges in those jurisdictions 
frequently were elected, inexperienced in class actions, and 
unsympathetic to large defendants from out of state.42 Meanwhile, 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction in cases based on state claims 
unless diversity of citizenship existed between the named plaintiffs 
and all of the defendants, and at least one of the plaintiffs satisfied 
the amount-in-controversy requirement.43 As a result, cases involving 
essentially identical alleged classes were often brought concurrently 
in multiple states around the country.44 Even when such cases could 
be brought in federal court, parallel state court class actions were also 
often filed.45 The inability to bring alleged classes—especially those 
whose class definitions overlapped or were nearly identical—under 
one court system in which courts could limit duplication created 
enormous waste and inefficiency.46 CAFA’s proponents argued it 
would improve efficiencies by granting federal court’s jurisdiction 
over the nation’s largest class actions.47 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Klonoff, supra note 6, at 732. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Burbank, supra note 33, at 1450-51; cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 
546, 559 (2005). A corporation is considered a citizen of its state of incorporation. Carden v. Arkoma 
Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 188 (1990) (citing Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1854) 
and Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844)). A corporation is also treated as citizens of 
the state in which it has its principal place of business. Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 88 (2010). Other 
types of business entities, in contrast, are treated as citizens of every state in which their members are 
citizens. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs. 49 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1990). 
 44. See Edward F. Sherman, The Multidistrict Litigation Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if 
a Class Action is not Possible, Proceedings of the Tulane Law Review Symposium: The Problem of 
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2223 (2008). 
 45. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 869 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2013) (involving 
conflicts between cases consolidated in federal court under the Multidistrict Litigation Statute and 
parallel state class actions). 
 46. Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the 
Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2005); Tanya Pierce, It’s Not 
Over ‘til It’s Over: Mandating Federal Pretrial Jurisdiction and Oversight in Mass Torts, 79 MO. L. 
REV. 27, 38 (2014) (citing Sherman, supra note 44). Some scholars, however, have questioned whether 
CAFA in fact exacerbated problems inherent in duplicative litigation. Sherman, supra note 44, at 2207–
08 (concluding CAFA resulted in a “blow to the centrality” of “resolving mass complex litigation”). 
 47. See Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. 592 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2010). Despite 
these stated goals in passing CAFA, an empirical study published five years later concluded that the 
number of personal-injury class actions filed in federal courts post-CAFA remained steady. Willging & 
Lee, supra note 35, at 780 (citing Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 845 (2010)); cf Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical 
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CAFA’s supporters also made much of the existence of “judicial 
hellholes”—state courts in which class certification was such a 
matter of course that the certifications became known as “drive by 
certifications.”48 Proponents also argued federal courts should decide 
large interstate class actions because such actions have the potential 
for enormous ramifications on large numbers of people, involve more 
money, and implicate interstate commerce.49 Thus, one of the 
statute’s primary stated purposes was also to “restore the intent of the 
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal 
court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under 
diversity jurisdiction.”50 The statute’s supporters also articulated a 
desire to prevent alleged abuses of the class action system, including 
                                                                                                                 
Analysis of Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 809, 816 (2010) 
(interpreting data to suggest “CAFA may have shifted class actions from state courts to federal courts 
generally, but not evenly,” because plaintiffs file class actions in what they perceived to be circuits with 
more plaintiff-friendly laws). 
 48. See Purcell, supra note 9, at 1872, 1886 n.249. 
 49. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 167–68 (2005) (citing S. REP. 109-14, 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6, 7) (quoting Senator Spector). It is also helpful to note that in passing CAFA, 
Congress did not divest state courts of authority to hear such actions if none of the parties seek to invoke 
CAFA’s federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michael P. Daly and Jessica D. Khan, We Got No Class and 
We Got No Principles: CAFA and the Denial of Class Certification, 32 NO. 1 CLASS ACTION REPORTS 
ART 1, Volume 32, Issue 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2011). Indeed, CAFA did not federalize all class actions, and 
some still proceed in state courts. Id. Nothing in CAFA’s statutory directives or legislative history 
suggests Congress intended federal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over class actions. In fact, 
CAFA requires federal courts to decline to exercise CAFA jurisdiction in some kinds of alleged class 
actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (2016) (providing “[a] district court shall decline to exercise 
jurisdiction” when “two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, 
and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed” or when 
“greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of 
the state in which the action was originally filed,” the “principal injuries resulting from the alleged 
conducted or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was 
originally filed,” and “during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class 
action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on 
behalf of the same or other persons,” and at least one of the defendants meets one of three listed 
options). It also allows federal courts to exercise discretion to decline to exercise CAFA jurisdiction in 
other kinds of alleged class actions. Id. The exercise of concurrent jurisdiction in these cases does not 
create problems of incompatible federal and state court jurisdiction or otherwise undermine federal 
interests. Thus, none of the reasons to overcome the presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction 
exists that might help courts answer the question of whether jurisdiction solely under CAFA should 
continue in the face of a denial of class certification. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4 (2005); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 
S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013) (noting “CAFA’s primary objective” is to ensure interstate cases of national 
importance are tried in federal court). 
9
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preventing plaintiffs from engaging in forum shopping and judicially 
sanctioned “blackmail.”51 
Even before the statute was finally enacted, however, some warned 
“no one should be fooled” by “talk about fairer procedures in federal 
courts, about how appropriate it is for national class actions to be in 
federal court before a single judge, and about how it would be much 
more efficient to hear disparate class actions that are filed in different 
states, but that involve very similar claims in one forum.”52 Instead, 
CAFA reflects an “unabashed effort” by defendants to forum shop in 
the hopes of improving “their chances of success markedly in class 
actions if they are in federal courts.”53 Not only did defendants 
believe class certification would be more challenging to achieve in 
federal courts, they also believed that even where classes were 
certified, plaintiffs would prevail less often in federal courts than in 
state courts.54 Proponents of CAFA, therefore, anticipated that these 
cases would perish in federal courts, and consequently, the 
motivation for plaintiffs to file these cases would diminish.55 
Given this backdrop, it is unsurprising that CAFA’s passage was 
highly political.56 Passing CAFA took eight years, during which 
several political compromises were made.57 Likewise, passing it 
required Republican majorities, and Republicans nearly unanimously 
supported it.58 Predictably, serious apprehension existed about 
                                                                                                                 
 51. S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 20 (2005 (“Judicial blackmail forces settlement of frivolous cases.” 
(quoting Senator Spector)). 
 52. See Morrison, supra note 46, at 1522–23 (analyzing provisions in CAFA’s predecessor statute, 
which were unchanged in the passed version of the statute). 
 53. Id. at 1523; see also, e.g., Georgene Vairo, Why I Don’t Teach Federal Courts Anymore, but 
Maybe Am or Will Again, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 843, 851 (characterizing CAFA as a “jurisdiction 
hogging” statute as much as a jurisdiction granting statute and identifying that its goal was to move 
these cases into federal court where a presumption existed that class certification would be denied). 
 54. Morrison, supra note 46, at 1861. 
 55. See id. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on class actions certainly posed challenges to those 
seeking to certify a class action under Rule 23. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 6, at 1098 (describing recent 
Supreme Court decisions limiting the use of the class action device in federal courts). 
 56. Purcell, supra note 9, at 1823. This fact is hardly surprising. As has been observed, “[n]o reform, 
however well intentioned, could alter federal jurisdiction in an entirely ‘neutral’ way, and not even the 
wisest reform could become law without the support of powerful political and social interests.” Id. at 
1860–61. 
 57. Id. at 1823. 
 58. Id. at 1861. 
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whether the concern over alleged abuses of the class action device 
were warranted, and, even if they were, whether they justified such a 
broad expansion in federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction.59 Many 
cautioned that CAFA would severely limit access to state courts by 
the county’s most vulnerable citizens who would no longer be able to 
seek redress in court for corporate wrongdoings.60 For those who 
opposed the statute, its passage “symbolized a battle between the 
common man and corporate behemoths” in which the corporations 
won.61 They decried CAFA as granting corporations “immunity from 
misdeeds through tort reform.”62 
Moreover, despite spending eight years drafting CAFA, Congress 
“did an especially poor job,” resulting in many ways in a vague and 
ambiguous statute, as illustrated by the amount of litigation its 
passage has generated.63 Some of the problems in the statute likely 
reflect compromises necessitated by the democratic process in which 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See Burbank, supra note 33, at 1522–23 (predicting that the “phenomenon of ‘drive-by class 
certification’ was on the cutting edge of obsolescence” when CAFA was passed and the “phenomenon 
of ever-changing magnet courts (‘judicial hellholes’) might well have run its course if left, not its own 
devices, but to the political process”); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1555 (“[N]either the 
cause of any malady nor the effectiveness of this cure [CAFA’s passage] is beyond debate.”); Purcell, 
supra note 9, at 1860–88 (describing arguments of proponents and opponents of CAFA regarding its 
goals and results). 
 60. See Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164–65, n.4 (D. Mass., 2005) (citing 151 Cong. 
Rec. H643-01, H644 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. McGovern stating, “it looks as though 
the Republican leadership has finally gamed the system to the point where it appears that they will 
succeed in severely limiting the rights of many of the most vulnerable citizens in this country” . . . . 
“[T]his bill . . . will limit fairness, it will limit justice, and it will ultimately hurt everyday 
Americans . . . . It closes the courthouse door in the face of people who need and deserve 
help” . . . and . . . ”unduly limits the right of individuals to seek redress for corporate wrongdoing in 
their state courts”). 
 61. Id. at 165–67 (citing, among others, 151 Cong. Rec. H723-01, H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2001) 
(statement of Rep. Conyers noting that vis a vis the Act, the Republican “majority begins their assault on 
our Nation’s civil justice system . . . [and] attempt[s] to preempt State class actions”). 
 62. Id. (citing Mike France, How to Fix the Tort System, BUS. WEEK ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2005), http:// 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_11/b3924601.htm (quoting Frederick M. Baron, former 
President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America)). Some have even questioned the 
constitutionality of the statute. See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce 
Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006). Indeed, some 
companies “boasted that CAFA’s ‘practical effect’ would be ‘that many cases will never be heard,’” 
while others “predicted approvingly that he bill would ‘make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.’” 
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1862. 
 63. In re HP Inkjet Printer Litigation, 716 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting “CAFA is poorly 
drafted” and characterizing its wording as “clumsy” and “bewildering”); see also Clermont & 
Eisenburg, supra note 10, at 1567. 
11
Pierce: Dueling Grants: Reimagining CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions
Published by Reading Room, 2017
734 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
laws are passed in this country.64 But while some of CAFA’s 
problems may not have been foreseen, it is clear from examining 
earlier versions of the act that from the first iteration, Congress was 
aware the question of continuing jurisdiction this article addresses 
would arise.65 As early as 1998, a proposed version of CAFA 
contained a provision requiring remand to state court if class 
certification failed.66 And, as late as 2003, the proposed version still 
contained such a provision.67 Before Congress passed the statute, 
however, it dropped that provision, leaving the statute silent as to the 
effect of a failed class certification.68 But as illustrated below, it left 
intact other ambiguous language that suggests Congress intended 
courts to dismiss or remand failed class actions if no other basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction remained.69 Insofar as CAFA was meant to 
minimize “wasteful” class action litigation, the inclusion of this 
ambiguous language has occasioned wasteful side-litigation in direct 
contrast to the efficiency gains some argued justified the statute’s 
enactment.70 
B. Policies Underlying Rule 23 
Turning to Rule 23, several important policies underlie the 
availability of class action treatment, many of which depend on the 
kind of class action alleged.71 For example, where plaintiffs’ alleged 
injuries are sufficiently sizable to justify individual lawsuits, the 
availability of class treatment fosters judicial economy and efficiency 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See id. 
 65. See CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION ACT OF 1998, H.R. REP. NO. 105–702, § 3, at 3–4 (1998). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Richardson, supra note 25, at 140 (citing Burbank, supra note 33). 
 68. See id.; Burbank, supra note 33, at 1444 n.12; Lowery v. Al. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206 
n.50 (11th Cir. 2007); Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the debate 
as to whether the Senate Report was issued prior to the vote on CAFA and thus as to whether courts 
should consider the report). 
 69. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1567 
 70. Id. 
 71. Wasserman, supra note 28, at 819 (identifying policies underlying Rule 23). Indeed, recently, a 
scholar convincingly observed that in attempting to limit aggregate damages class actions, “courts and 
lawmakers are imposing unwarranted constraints” that have resulted in unintended and unjustified 
negative consequences on the more traditional kinds of class actions. Maureen Carroll, Class Action 
Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 845 (2016). 
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by preventing overlapping, duplicative litigation.72 Conversely, in 
situations where the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are small enough that 
suing would not make sense, class treatment affords an opportunity 
to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights, when plaintiffs would otherwise have 
no means or incentive to do so.73 That opportunity, in turn, deters 
wrongdoing by allowing plaintiffs to enforce the substantive law 
underlying their claims.74 Class treatment also preserves resources by 
providing plaintiffs a vehicle through which to spread the costs of 
litigation among a large group of similarly situated individuals, rather 
than bearing the costs individually.75 Likewise, treatment as a class 
can protect defendants from inefficiently having to defend multiple 
lawsuits.76 And, it eliminates the possibility of inconsistent 
judgments being rendered against the same defendants.77 
II. CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions 
When interpreting statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently 
required statutory construction to “begin with the language employed 
by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose” of the 
statute.78 In contrast to CAFA’s ambiguities regarding jurisdiction in 
post-denial of certification scenarios, CAFA’s grant of jurisdiction in 
two situations—before a certification decision is reached and after a 
class is certified—is straightforward.79 By its ordinary language, 
CAFA plainly provides federal courts with jurisdiction before a court 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Wasserman, supra note 28, at 819. 
 73. Id. (noting that in these cases, Rule 23 “does not conserve judicial resources at all but rather 
authorizes the filing of a class action, the prosecution of which may consume significant judicial 
resources” because in the rule’s absence, “few if any lawsuits would be filed and few if any judicial 
resources would be expended”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 819–20 (“Typically the lawyer representing the class advances the costs of litigation and in 
the event the class recovers a monetary award, these costs and the attorney’s fees are paid from the 
recovery.”). 
 76. Id. at 820. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76, (2009) (citation omitted); cf. Household 
Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfenning, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004); U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) 
(warning that discerning congressional purpose is a hazardous matter). 
 79. Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 1. 
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decides certification and after a court grants certification; thus, little 
controversy should exist regarding the operation of jurisdiction in 
these scenarios.80 Some courts, however, have rationalized their 
decisions to continue jurisdiction after a class fails, based on 
warnings that are contradicted by the statute’s straightforward 
language.81 Therefore, the following discussion briefly illustrates 
how the statute’s ordinary language makes clear how jurisdiction 
exists before a certification decision no matter what a court 
ultimately decides about the appropriateness of proceeding as a class 
and how such jurisdiction always continues after a positive 
decision.82 
A. Before Certification and After Positive Decision 
Two sections of CAFA, read together, plainly provide federal 
courts with original jurisdiction over actions as soon as a qualifying 
class is alleged.83 First, section 1332(d)(2) of the statute states: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 
and is a class action in which (A) any member of a class of 
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any 
defendant . . . .84 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. 
 81. Samuel v. Universal Health Serv., 805 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 82. Some courts have stated that concluding jurisdiction ends with a negative class certification 
decision would mean jurisdiction did not exist from the beginning. See discussion, infra, at Part III.A. 
 83. Even if apparent from the face of the pleadings that the action cannot qualify as a class action, 
these provisions provide a federal court with jurisdiction to make that determination. 
 84. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2) (2016)) (emphasis added). The diversity jurisdiction authorized by CAFA’s jurisdictional 
provisions is not absolute. Indeed CAFA itself contains narrow exceptions to the grant of jurisdiction it 
otherwise provides. For example, section 1332(d)(4), which describes the local controversy exception, 
requires a district court to “decline to exercise jurisdiction” under CAFA if certain prerequisites are met. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). CAFA also makes clear that its jurisdictional provisions do not apply to class 
actions in which “the primary defendants are States, State officials, or any governmental entities against 
whom the district court may be foreclosed from entering relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5). In addition, 
CAFA gives courts discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction “in the interests of justice and looking at 
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Second, CAFA defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed 
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar 
State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be 
brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.”85 
Applying ordinary meaning to the language in these provisions 
results in the understanding that as soon as a qualifying class is 
alleged, CAFA provides federal courts with original jurisdiction. No 
other sections of the statute create ambiguity in this situation because 
the statute goes on to state CAFA applies “to any class 
action . . . before . . . the entry of a class certification order by the 
court with respect to that action.”86 
If Congress had intended something else, for example, if it 
intended that this initial grant of jurisdiction under CAFA to be 
contingent on a class first being certified, it could have achieved this 
outcome in a number of ways. It could have defined a “class action” 
as “an action certified by a court to proceed as a class under Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule 
of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought . . . as a 
class action.”87 Even simpler, it could have inserted the word 
“certified” in the jurisdictional grant language, so it would read, 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action that has been certified to proceed as a class action under any 
statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be 
brought by one or more representative persons as a class action.”88 
Instead, by its plain language, CAFA confers jurisdiction over 
qualifying class actions as soon as they are “filed” or “brought.”89 
The word “brought” should be interpreted to mean “filed.”90 Indeed, 
Merriam-Webster’s defines the word “bring” in the context of a legal 
                                                                                                                 
the totality of the circumstances,” when greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the plaintiff 
class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the state where the action is originally filed. 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 89. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 90. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
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action to mean “institute.”91 Suggesting CAFA requires certification 
before federal courts may assert jurisdiction would directly conflict 
with the statute’s language, and any suggestion that jurisdiction must 
continue after a class fails to avoid finding jurisdiction never existed 
is flawed when considered in light of the statute’s ordinary language 
to the contrary. 
CAFA also makes clear that jurisdiction continues after a court 
certifies a class under Rule 23.92 The relevant provision states, 
“[CAFA’s jurisdictional grant] shall apply to any class 
action . . . after the entry of a class certification order by the court 
with respect to that action.”93 The statute defines “class certification 
order” to mean “an order issued by a court approving the treatment of 
some or all aspects of a civil action as a class action.”94 For cases in 
which a court certifies a class action, this provision creates no 
ambiguity, and no controversy exists in this situation. 
B. After Denial of Certification 
If Congress had stopped at the original grant language in section 
1332(d)(2) and the definition of class action in section 1332(d)(1)(c), 
it could have avoided much confusion. Whenever a plaintiff filed a 
class action that met CAFA’s numerosity, minimal diversity, and 
amount-in-controversy requirements, and the alleged class did not 
fall within one of the exceptions to CAFA, federal courts would have 
original subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA—end of story.95 But, 
instead of stopping, Congress included language that “[CAFA] shall 
apply to any class action before or after entry of a class certification 
order . . . .”96 And, it defined “class certification order” as “an order 
issued by a court approving the treatment of some or all aspects of a 
civil action as a class action.”97 Read together with CAFA’s “before 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Bring, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005). 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). 
 93. Id. 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C). 
 95. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 96. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C). 
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or after” language, the definition of class certification order could be 
interpreted to mean that a federal court’s jurisdiction based on CAFA 
does not survive if a court denies a request for class certification 
without approving at least some aspects of the action for class 
treatment.98 The definition of “class certification” does not include an 
order denying class treatment.99 Unfortunately, the statute also does 
not say here or anywhere else what happens to a federal court’s 
jurisdiction after a court denies class treatment for all aspects of a 
case.100 As a result, the Supreme Court’s admonition that statutory 
interpretation should “begin with the language employed by 
Congress”101 is not sufficient here.102 Confusion and conflicting 
interpretations abound. 
III. Analyzing CAFA’s Relevant Provisions 
Compounding the confusion, some courts cannot even agree about 
the existence or the extent of disagreement surrounding this critical 
question.103 For example, in 2009, the First Circuit noted that 
“whether a later denial of class certification will divest the district 
court of CAFA jurisdiction” was an open question.104 Then, in 2011, 
                                                                                                                 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8), (d)(1)(C). See also Burbank, supra note 33, at 1455–56 (“The question 
arises, however, whether jurisdiction subsists when, in a case brought in or removed to federal court 
under CAFA, the court declines to certify a class.”); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1015–16 (2006) (questioning what happens if a court denies certification and 
opining that “the denial will not oust jurisdiction, because the court reached a determination that the 
case was a class action for jurisdictional purposes under a different and lower standard of proof than the 
determination that the case was not a class action for certification purposes”). 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added). 
 100. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 101. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–76, (2009) (citation omitted); cf. Household 
Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfenning, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004) (citation omitted) (explaining that courts should 
consider the “particular statutory language at issue” and “the language and design of statute as a 
whole”); U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (warning that discerning congressional purpose is a 
hazardous matter). 
 102. That the plain language of the statute does not answer the continuing jurisdiction question is 
aptly illustrated by comparing plain language arguments made by two commentators who analyzed the 
words “class action” and “filed under” in CAFA and reached opposite conclusions as to whether these 
words mean jurisdiction after a denial of class certification should continue. Compare Richardson, supra 
note 25, at 135 (stating they mean jurisdiction continues), with Lampone, supra note 26, at 1164–65 
(stating they mean jurisdiction ends). 
 103. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 104–106. 
 104. College of Dental Surgeons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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a district court in Louisiana opined that a “consensus has begun to 
emerge” that subject matter jurisdiction under the statute continues 
even after certification is denied.105 But in 2014, a district court in 
Florida disagreed, declaring, “[d]escribing this area of law as ‘in 
flux’ would not capture the extent of discordant outcomes presented 
by the relevant authorities.”106 
A. Conflicting Interpretations 
Though the law is “in flux,” recently, a number of circuit courts 
and scholars have concluded jurisdiction continues after certification 
fails.107 Of course, that interpretation is not the only one,108 nor is it 
the most likely correct one. Other courts conclude jurisdiction under 
CAFA ceases after a court denies certification,109 and this article 
agrees. The following discussion summarizes arguments that have 
been made in favor of and against continuing jurisdiction, critiques 
the arguments where appropriate, illustrates why CAFA’s 
jurisdictional grant does not survive after a class fails, and explains 
how courts can limit the possibility of losing authority over cases that 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Samuel v. Universal Health Serv., 805 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 106. Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL 1274119, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 
2014), aff’d, 621 F. App’x 945 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 107. Louisiana v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014); Metz v. Unizan 
Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2011); Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. 592 F.3d 805, 806 
(7th Cir. 2010); In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir. 2010); United Steel, 
Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 
602 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010); Rivers v. Chalmette Med. Ctr., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295 
(E.D. La. 2011); Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 685 F. Supp. 2d 557, 568 (W.D. Pa. 2010); WILLIAM 
RUBENSTEIN, ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:18 (5th ed. 2016). But see Walewski v. 
Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (recognizing but disagreeing 
with this trend). 
 108. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 98, at 1016 (pointing out the question of what to do with cases 
removed to federal court under CAFA after a denial of certification “bedeviled” the civil procedure 
listserve, and some found it illogical to apply a different meaning of “class action” for jurisdiction than 
for certification, which Clermont argued would reconcile CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions and provide 
for continuing federal subject matter jurisdiction in the event of a denial of class certification). 
 109. See, e.g., Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862; Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No 07-1817, 2009 WL 
1703224, at *2 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009); Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., No. 07–cv–0064, 2008 WL 
5054108, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008); Jones v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 07–22328–CIV, 2008 WL 
4541016, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2008); Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 
(S.D. Fla. 2008); Arabian v. Sony Elecs. Inc., No. 05CV1741, 2007 WL 2701340, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 
13, 2007). However, it should be noted that some of these cases were decided before courts in their 
respective circuits declared that jurisdiction continues after the denial of class certification. 
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most directly implicate CAFA’s goal of having federal courts 
exercise jurisdiction over the nation’s largest class actions. 
1. Jurisdiction Continues 
The clear trend in circuit courts is to conclude that once a non-
frivolous case is filed or removed to federal court under CAFA, the 
federal court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction no matter 
how certification is ultimately decided.110 Some scholars have 
agreed.111 Those who conclude jurisdiction continues generally rely 
on a combination of the following factors: (1) dicta in an unrelated 
opinion, (2) the statute’s placement in the general diversity statute, 
(3) the way the statute uses the terms “filed under,” and (4) 
prudential concerns about efficiency and forum manipulation.112 
a. Dicta in Vega 
Beginning with the earliest circuit court decision adopting this 
interpretation, courts have relied heavily on dicta from the Eleventh 
Circuit in its 2009 opinion in the Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. case.113 
There, the court upheld the certification of a class action on other 
grounds but stated in a footnote, “jurisdictional facts are assessed at 
the time of removal; and post-removal events (including non-
certification, de-certification, or severance) do not deprive federal 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”114 Other courts seized on this 
statement and have consistently cited Vega in support of the position 
that continuing jurisdiction under CAFA is not conditioned on a class 
eventually being certified.115 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Wright Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Corp., 841 F. 3d 1266, 1272 – 73 (11th Cir. 2016); Am. Nat’l Prop. 
& Cas. Co., 746 F.3d at 635; Metz, 649 F.3d at 500; Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807; In re Burlington, 
606 F.3d at 380; United Steel, 602 F.3d at 1092. See also Rivers v. Chalmette Med. Center, Inc., 805 F. 
Supp. 2d 291, 296 (E.D. La. 2011); Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 685 F. Supp. 2d 557, 563 (W.D. Pa. 
2010). 
 111. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 25, at 121; Clermont, supra note 98, at 1016. 
 112. See discussion and citations infra Sections III.A.1.a., III.A.1.b., III.A.1.c., and III.A.1.d. 
 113. See, e.g., Cunningham, 592 F. 3d at 806. 
 114. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 115. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d at 639; Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01; United Steel, 
602 F.3d at 1091; Cunningham, 592 F. 3d at 806. 
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b. Placement in Diversity Statute 
Certainly, however, those that conclude jurisdiction continues do 
not do so solely based on Vega.116 Because CAFA’s jurisdictional 
provisions were included as amendments to the general diversity 
statute, and because CAFA has been characterized as “at base, an 
extension of diversity jurisdiction,” many courts and scholars have 
examined interpretations of the general diversity statute for 
guidance.117 Of course, in regular cases filed in or removed to federal 
court on the basis of jurisdiction provided by the general diversity 
statute, courts examine jurisdictional facts that exist at the time the 
case is filed or removed.118 And the axiom “once jurisdiction, always 
jurisdiction,” from St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 
is nearly black letter law.119 Later events do not divest federal courts 
of jurisdiction under the general diversity statute.120 Applying this 
“once jurisdiction, always jurisdiction” rule to CAFA cases just as 
they do to general diversity cases, some courts and commentators 
erroneously conclude CAFA jurisdiction continues regardless of any 
later decision regarding certification.121 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d at 635; Metz, 649 F.3d at 501; Cunningham, 592 F. 3d at 
807; In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2010); United Steel, 602 F.3d at 
1091–92. See also Rivers v. Chalmette Med. Center, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296 (E.D. La. 2011); 
Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 685 F. Supp. 2d 557, 563 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
 117. See, e.g., In re Burlington, 606 F.3d at 381. 
 118. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570–71 (2004) (recognizing the 
general rule that “for purposes of determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of 
the parties is to be determined with reference to the facts as they existed at the time of filing”); Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc. 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (per curiam) (“We have consistently held 
that if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by 
subsequent events.”); Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 746 F.3d at 635; Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248–49 
(5th Cir. 1996); Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing that “removal jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the complaint at the time of 
removal”). 
 119. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 107; Scott Dodson & Phillip A. Pucillo, Joint and Several 
Jurisdiction, 65 DUKE L. J. 1323, 1346 n.135 (2016) (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3608 (3d ed. 2014) (“It has long been hornbook law . . . that whether federal 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists is determined by examining the citizenship of the parties at the 
time the action is commenced by filing the complaint . . . .” In the case of removal, “the majority of 
decisions typically require complete diversity to exist at the time the removal petition is filed.”)). 
 120. Metz, 649 F.3d at 501; In re Burlington, 606 F.3d at 381; United Steel, 602 F.3d at 1091–92. 
 121. See Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(“After it denied class certification, the district court dismissed Walewski’s complaint for lack of 
standing.”). 
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Supporters of this position view a later denial of a class 
certification request as the kind of change in a jurisdictional fact that 
does not affect continued jurisdiction.122 Rather than treating the 
failure of certification as an alleged jurisdictional fact that was 
“untrue” at the time of filing or removal, they treat the failure of 
certification as a fact that occurred at a later time—after jurisdiction 
had already attached.123 These courts treat post-removal denial of 
class certification as “‘not meaningfully different’ from other post-
removal changes,” like changes in a party’s domicile, and thus, they 
mistakenly conclude that the rule that jurisdiction, “once properly 
established, remains and is not affected by subsequent events in the 
litigation,” applies with equal force to class actions filed in or 
removed to federal court under CAFA.124 
These courts warn an alternate interpretation “would mean that 
prior to class certification, jurisdiction would neither exist nor not 
exist. Instead, the lawsuit would float in some kind of suspended 
animation.”125 They insist that holding a court no longer has subject 
matter jurisdiction after a denial of certification would mean not only 
that the court would have “no jurisdiction going forward, but the 
court would be deemed to have never had jurisdiction. Everything 
that came before the court’s decision . . . would be wiped out.”126 In 
addition, because determining class certification sometimes requires 
ruling on discovery issues and other motions, these courts warn that 
determining a court never had power to rule on those issues would 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 637 n.2. 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 636, 639. 
 124. Louisiana v. AAA Ins., No. 07-5528, 2011 WL 5118859, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2011) (citing 
Samuel v. Universal Health Servs., 805 F. Supp. 2d 284, 289 (E.D. La. 2011); United Steel, 602 F.3d at 
1092; Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010); and (improperly) 
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009)). Other courts, however, 
disagree, holding jurisdiction could not have existed at the time of filing or removal because the later 
failure of class certification means no class actually existed when the case was filed or removed to 
federal court. See, e.g., Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No. 07-1817, 2009 WL 1703224, at *2 (D. 
Minn. June 18, 2009) (collecting cases). 
 125. Calvillo v. Siouxland Urology Assocs. P.C., No. CIV. 09–4051–KES, 2011 WL 5155093, at *5 
(D.S.D. Oct. 28, 2011) (citing Delsing v. Starbucks Coffee Corp., No. 08-cv-1154, 2010 WL 1507642 
(D. Minn. Apr. 14, 2010)). 
 126. Id. 
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inefficiently render those earlier orders moot.127 Thus, they reason 
policy considerations underlying the “once jurisdiction, always 
jurisdiction” rule, such as the desire to promote efficiency and avoid 
expense and delay, weigh in favor of interpreting federal courts’ 
jurisdiction under CAFA to continue even after a denial of class 
certification.128 These arguments, however, ignore CAFA’s ordinary 
language that makes clear jurisdiction exists from the time a 
qualifying putative class action is alleged until a certification 
decision is reached, no matter what that certification decision turns 
out to be. 
c. “Filed Under” 
Supporters of continuing jurisdiction have also argued if an action 
meets the “class action” definition at the time of filing, “the key 
requirement of CAFA jurisdiction” would be met, and no other 
jurisdictional inquiry would be necessary.129 The term “class action” 
as used in CAFA’s grant of jurisdiction requires only that an action 
must be filed as a class action of the kind described in the jurisdiction 
granting language in section 1332(d)(2).130 That section reads, “The 
district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in 
which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class 
action . . . .”131 The statute defines “class action,” as “any civil action 
filed under rule 23” or a state equivalent.132 Read together, the 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See, e.g., id. at *5. These arguments are not exclusive to jurisdiction under CAFA, however. 
Indeed, the rule that a federal court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction lacks power to proceed, even if 
the case has been litigated productively for years, is in no way a new rule. See Scott Dodson, 
Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1455–56 (2011); Dodson & Pucillo, supra note 119, 
at 1326 (citing Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 
 128. AAA Ins., 2011 WL 5118859, at *7. 
 129. Richardson, supra note 25, at 139. See also Clermont, supra note 98, at 1015–16 (opining that a 
denial of class certification should not oust jurisdiction over a case removed to federal court under 
CAFA because a court reached a determination that the case was a class action for jurisdictional 
purposes at that point employing a lower standard of proof than required to certify a class action). 
 130. Richardson, supra note 25, at 147 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2016) and concluding 
overall that jurisdiction continues, but arguing federal courts should nevertheless abstain from retaining 
jurisdiction over these cases). 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 132. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
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argument is these provisions reflect Congress’s intent for courts to 
assess jurisdiction at the time a civil action is filed.133 
In addition, rather than viewing as problematic section 
1332(d)(8)’s “before or after the entry of a class certification order” 
language together with CAFA’s definition of a “class certification 
order” as “an order issued by a court approving the treatment of some 
or all aspects of a civil action as a class action,” they construe the 
provisions to buttress their position that an action can be a “class 
action” for purposes of CAFA, even after a class is denied.134 
Because the statute does not indicate what consequences a denial of 
certification may have on continuing jurisdiction, proponents state 
the statute should not be interpreted to mean the eventual denial of 
class certification or a later decertification of a certified class 
“remove[s] an action from the ambit of the term ‘class action,’” such 
that dismissal or remand would be required.135 Potentially ignoring 
certain aspects of CAFA’s removal provisions, they further contend 
the “before or after” and “class certification order” provisions should 
be understood to mean merely that putative class actions may be 
removed after a class certification order is signed.136 
d. Prudential Concerns 
Those that conclude jurisdiction continues also warn that if 
jurisdiction were to be lost when class claims fail, plaintiffs could 
engage in forum shopping by withdrawing their class claims to create 
an opportunity for remand to state court or for dismissal without 
prejudice.137 Retaining jurisdiction, they argue, properly avoids 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Richardson, supra note 25, at 147 (concluding overall that jurisdiction continues and arguing the 
policies underlying CAFA nevertheless suggests federal courts should abstain from retaining 
jurisdiction over these cases). 
 134. Id. at 137 n.114. 
 135. Id. at 139. 
 136. Id. at 139; see also Clermont, supra note 98, at 1015–16. 
 137. See, e.g., Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No 07-1817, 2009 WL 1703224, at *1 (D. Minn. June 
18, 2009) (citing Garcia v. Boyar & Miller, P. C., Nos. 3:06–CV–1936–D, 3:06–CV–1937–D, 3:06–
CV–1938–D, 3:06–CV–1939–D, 3:06–CV–2177–D, 3:06–CV–2206–D; 3:06–CV–2236–D, 3:06–CV–
2241–D, 2007 WL 1556961, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2007)); Genenbacher v. Centurytel Fiber Co. II, 
LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1017 n.3. These concerns are not limited to decisions dealing with 
jurisdiction under CAFA; they exist when interpreting the general diversity statute as well. See, e.g., 
23
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shunting cases between state and federal courts because “litigation is 
not ping-pong.”138 They warn an alternative interpretation would 
undermine the policy that seeks to have class actions “within the 
scope of the Act” litigated in federal, rather than state, courts.139 But 
like the attempts to minimize the effects of the “before or after” the 
entry of a “class certification” language outlined above, these 
arguments also fail to recognize that CAFA’s removal provisions 
incorporate certain limitations contained in the general diversity 
statute’s removal provisions. 
Finally, proponents of continuing jurisdiction point out that 
allowing jurisdiction to end after a denial of class certification would 
frustrate certain provisions of Rule 23.140 For example, Rule 
23(c)(1)(C) states, “[a]n order that grants or denies class certification 
may be altered or amended before final judgment.”141 So, even if 
class certification were to be denied, Rule 23 provides a court with 
authority to revisit that certification decision later.142 Indeed, district 
courts retain discretion to modify certification orders if doing so 
would be appropriate in the light of subsequent developments in the 
litigation,143 and they “can always alter, or indeed revoke, class 
certification at any time before final judgment is entered should a 
change in circumstances” render class treatment inappropriate.144 
                                                                                                                 
Dodson & Pucillo, supra note 119 (“Diversity jurisdiction [is] both more complicated than federal-
question jurisdiction and more susceptible to party gamesmanship,” and thus, “[c]ompliance with the 
diversity requirements can be difficult to determine.”); Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional 
Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011) (subject matter jurisdiction is anything but clear and simple, despite the 
fact that scholars and judges consistently promote the idea that jurisdictional rules should be clear and 
simple). 
 138. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 139. Id. See Part III, infra, discussing how this concern is overstated because it fails to recognize that 
CAFA’s removal provision incorporated certain limitations contained in the general removal provisions. 
 140. See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 107. 
 141. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 142. See, e.g., Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No 07-1817, 2009 WL 1703224, at *1 (D. Minn. June 
18, 2009) (citing Allen–Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 07-cv-4087, 2009 WL 1285522, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
May 5, 2009); Genenbacher, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1017; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (providing for 
jurisdiction “before . . . the entry of a class certification order”)); J.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., No. 00-CV-
513S, 2011 WL 4498369, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (citing Wu v. MAMSI Life & Health Ins. 
Co., 256 F.R.D. 158 (D. Md. 2008)). 
 143. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 144. Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 104 n.9 (2d Cir. 
2007); Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining if the district court 
24
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Similarly, if a plaintiff were able to correct deficiencies in his or her 
alleged class action, a court could later certify the class, even though 
it had earlier rejected it.145 But, if a denial of certification were to 
strip the district court of continuing jurisdiction, courts would not 
have the opportunity to revisit earlier certification decisions in the 
way that Rule 23 contemplates.146 While these concerns are 
compelling, this article suggests the best way to address them is to 
allow the parties an occasion to provide briefing regarding the 
likelihood that an apparent class deficiency might be remedied later 
before denying certification if the court is inclined to reject class 
treatment. 
2. Jurisdiction Ends 
In contrast, some courts and commentators have relied on the same 
factors as courts reaching the opposite conclusion to conclude 
jurisdiction under CAFA ceases after a court denies certification.147 
Supporters of interpreting CAFA jurisdiction as ending tend to 
characterize CAFA’s jurisdiction as either provisional, continuing 
after certification only if the decision is a positive one, on the one 
hand, or entirely dependent on certification, ceasing to have ever 
existed if the decision is a negative one, on the other hand.148 While 
                                                                                                                 
determines that circumstances have changed such that class treatment is no longer appropriate, the court 
may at that point consider whether to modify or decertify the class); Weinman v. Fid. Capital 
Appreciation Fund (In re Integra Realty Res., Inc.), 354 F.3d 1246, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A] trial 
court overseeing a class action retains the ability to monitor the appropriateness of class certification 
throughout the proceedings and to modify or decertify a class at any time before final judgment.”). 
 145. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). Certain class deficiencies may be remediated. Wasserman, supra 
note 28, at 857–58. Examples of deficiencies that may be remedied include problems with the proposed 
class representative because his or her claims are not typical of the absent class members’ claims, 
because his or her lawyer lacks sufficient experience in class action litigation, or because there exist 
conflicts of interests between the representative and the rest of the class. Id. at 855. Examples of 
problems inherent in a class action itself include a lack of numerosity or the failure of class issues to 
predominate over individual questions. Id. 
 146. See Richardson, supra note 25, at 139–140 (arguing resort to statutory history is inappropriate, 
however, given that the statutory language in his opinion was clear). 
 147. See e.g., Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1267–70 (S.D. Fla. 2008); see 
Lampone, supra note 26, at 1151–52. 
 148. See e.g., Rivera v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 256, 263 (D.N.J. 2009) (CAFA 
jurisdiction is provisional); Lampone, supra note 26, at 1151–53 (CAFA jurisdiction is entirely 
dependent on certification). 
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the latter characterization and several of the arguments made to 
justify the conclusion that jurisdiction ends are flawed, many are not. 
Ultimately, an analysis of CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions that is 
most consistent with the statute’s language and that avoids ignoring 
certain relevant but problematic provisions reveals the conclusion is 
correct, despite the clear trend by circuit courts to reach the opposite 
conclusion. 
a. Dicta in Vega 
Reliance on Vega to support continuing jurisdiction is misplaced 
because the pertinent language was in fact “dicta” with no 
precedential value. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has not treated 
consistently cases in which federal court jurisdiction is predicated on 
CAFA, but class claims later fail.149In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit 
appeared to unambiguously reject the way in which other courts 
interpreted its earlier dicta in Vega.150 But more recently, the court 
reversed course.151 In an earlier case, Walewski, the Eleventh Circuit 
held CAFA jurisdiction expires when a request for certification is 
denied.152 There, the plaintiff was a gamer who alleged he had spent 
over 450 hours over a few months time playing the video game, The 
Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion.153 Relying on CAFA for federal court 
jurisdiction,154 Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the 
companies that manufactured and marketed the game, alleging an 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Gelfound v. Metlife Ins. Co. of Conn., 313 F.R.D. 674, 680 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (comparing 
Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) with Vega v. T–
Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n. 12 (11th Cir. 2009), noting the Eleventh Circuit’s 
“conflicting guidance on this issue,” and recognizing the lack of precedential value of either opinion on 
the issue as one appears in an unpublished opinion and the other appears as mere dicta). 
 150. See Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862; Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 
2014 WL 1274119, at *1, *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2014). “Dicta” refers to a court’s comments that are not 
necessary to the decision and thus not precedential. Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). “Dicta” is the plural form of “obiter dictum,” which is defined as “[a] judicial comment made 
while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore 
not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” Id. 
 151. Wright Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Corp., 841 F.3d 1266, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 152. See Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862. 
 153. Id. at 859. 
 154. Class Action Complaint at ¶4, Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., No. 6:11–cv–1178–Orl–
28DAB (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2011), 2011 WL 2790627. 
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animation defect left him unable to trigger certain simulations needed 
to complete the game’s main quest and numerous side quests.155 He 
sued for alleged violations of various Maryland laws because he 
contended the defendants falsely represented that the game was open-
ended and could go on indefinitely, but the animation defect caused 
that claim to be untrue and rendered the game less valuable than it 
would have been had the claim been true.156 The district court denied 
class certification because plaintiff failed to adequately define the 
class, and dismissed the case for lack of standing due to complicated 
choice of law issues and for the overly broad class allegations.157 The 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the dismissal.158 
Interestingly, although the opinion does not mention the conflict 
regarding whether jurisdiction under CAFA continues after the denial 
of a certification request, the Eleventh Circuit weighed in on the 
issue.159 Because the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of 
action based on standing, as well as for problems with the alleged 
class, the Eleventh Circuit could have upheld the decision without 
confronting the jurisdictional issue.160 In fact, in light of the 
uncertainty surrounding the issue, some courts have done exactly 
that—simply acknowledging the existence of a split of authority and 
then limiting their holdings to avoid entering the fray.161 In contrast, 
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged it had authority to “affirm the 
district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record.”162 
It then affirmed the dismissal on the expressed grounds that “absent 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 859. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 860. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action based on Maryland law, when Florida 
law should have applied. Id. Plaintiff argued that the district court should not have concluded Florida 
law applied before allowing discovery on the choice-of-law issue. Id. 
 158. Id. at 862. 
 159. Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See, e.g., Schraeder v. Demilec (USA) LLC, No. 12-6074, 2014 WL 1391714, at *2–3 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 8, 2014) (noting that the Third Circuit has yet to answer the question, circuits are split, and serious 
questions thus existed about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction before granting plaintiffs’ request to 
dismiss the action without prejudice under Rule 41(a) (citing Kaufman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 245 
F.2d 918, 919 (3d Cir.1957)). But of course, that option is available when a court has other grounds on 
which to rest a dismissal, but not when such grounds do not exist. 
 162. Walewski, 502 F. App’x at 862 (citing Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1123–24 (11th 
Cir. 1993)). 
27
Pierce: Dueling Grants: Reimagining CAFA’s Jurisdictional Provisions
Published by Reading Room, 2017
750 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
certification as a class action, the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] individual claim.”163 Finding CAFA 
jurisdiction absent, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the 
district court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s case under the 
general diversity statute and determined to a legal certainty the 
plaintiff’s alleged damages could not exceed $75,000.164 
In Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, a district court confronted 
other courts’ reliance on Vega more directly.165 There, the district 
court, sua sponte, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction after it 
denied the plaintiff’s request for class certification.166 The plaintiff in 
Karhu had sued a dietary supplement maker for falsely advertising 
that its product would burn fat and cause rapid fat loss, alleging 
causes of action under various state and federal laws.167 Because it 
denied class certification, the court held the plaintiff’s claims fell 
“outside the circumstances in which subject-matter jurisdiction 
adheres” under the “before or after” provision of CAFA.168 Thus, the 
court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
case.169 After noting the plaintiff’s remaining individual claims failed 
to qualify for jurisdiction under CAFA, the court concluded the 
plaintiff did not satisfy jurisdictional requirements under either the 
federal question statute or the general diversity statute.170 While it 
recognized federal courts disagree about how a denial of class 
certification affects subject matter jurisdiction, the court rejected the 
assertion that “a denial of class certification does not impact CAFA 
subject-matter jurisdiction.”171 
In 2016, however, without reference to Walewski or Karhu, the 
Eleventh Circuit changed direction in Wright Transportation, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. (“We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record, 
whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL 1274119, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 27, 2014). 
 166. Id. at *1. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2016)). 
 169. Id. at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8)). 
 170. Id. at *1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (d)). 
 171. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119, at *2–3. 
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Pilot Corporation,172 when it joined the other circuit courts that have 
cited Vega to support the conclusion that jurisdiction is not ousted 
when plaintiffs’ class action claims fail. In the Wright case, the 
Eleventh Circuit held CAFA conferred jurisdiction over all of the 
plaintiff’s claims at the time plaintiff filed the alleged class action, 
and that jurisdiction continued after the dismissal of plaintiff’s class 
allegations.173 As to when jurisdiction would not continue, the court 
opined, “[c]lass-action claims filed in or removed to federal court 
under CAFA can be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if those claims 
contain frivolous attempts to invoke CAFA jurisdiction or lack the 
expectation that a class may be eventually certified.”174 It 
characterized these types of dismissals as meaning “the federal court 
never had CAFA jurisdiction in the first place; they do not mean that 
jurisdiction existed and then was lost.”175 Where, however, a post-
filing action—other than an amendment to the complaint—defeats 
the class allegations, the court concluded that “CAFA continues to 
confer original federal jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 
claims . . . .”176  
 
b. Placement in Diversity Statute 
 
Courts that view jurisdiction as ending characterize certification 
decisions as legal determinations of earlier, already existing facts.177 
As a result, these courts view St. Paul Mercury as inapposite.178 In 
contrast to the facts there, the jurisdictional disqualifying facts in 
CAFA cases exist at the time of filing or removal, they just are not 
                                                                                                                 
 172. 841 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 173. Id. at 1272–73. 
 174. Id. at 1271 (citing Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 
2010)). 
 175. Id. (citing Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806–07). 
 176. Id. at 1272. 
 177. Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No. 07-1817, 2009 WL 1703224, at *2 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) 
(citing Muehlbauer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05 C 2676, 2009 WL 874511, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 
2009); Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., No. 07–cv–0064, 2008 WL 5054108, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 
20, 2008); Jones v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 07–22328–CIV, 2008 WL 4541016, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 
2008); Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Arabian v. Sony 
Elecs. Inc., No. 05CV1741, 2007 WL 2701340, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007)). 
 178. See Lampone, supra note 26, at 1163–64. 
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discovered until after the certification decision.179 Their prior 
existence means jurisdiction could not have attached in the first place 
because “a certifiable class does not—and never did—exist.”180 
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Wright, that CAFA 
jurisdiction does not attach when attempts to invoke CAFA 
jurisdiction are frivolous or clearly hopeless, these courts analogize a 
later failed class in a CAFA case to a mistaken understanding about 
where a party was domiciled at the time of filing or removal that was 
not discovered until later.181 There, the true domicile meant the 
parties lacked the requisite diversity of citizenship at the time of 
filing or removal, so jurisdiction never attached.182 In addition, it is 
well settled that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction strips a court of 
the power to proceed, no matter how long a case has been litigated 
and no matter how productive the litigation had been prior to the 
discovery of the jurisdictional defect.183 Thus, the fact that 
certification decisions take time is not seen as requiring reading 
CAFA to provide continuing jurisdiction when the statute does not 
expressly state that jurisdiction continues. A better, more 
straightforward argument, however, would rely on the statute’s 
specific provisions that grant jurisdiction before a certification 
decision is reached. Thus, concerns related to the later certification 
decision’s effect on the jurisdiction of courts earlier in the case are 
misplaced. 
Other courts that conclude jurisdiction ends interpret the nature of 
the statute’s jurisdictional grant differently. They view the statute as 
providing federal courts with provisional jurisdiction until a court can 
decide whether the case qualifies for class treatment.184 Because it is 
impossible to know the validity of the class allegations until the 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See, e.g., id.; Salazar, 2008 WL 5054108, at *6, abrogated by United Steel, 602 F.3d at 1092. 
 180. Salazar, 2008 WL 5054108, at *6. 
 181. Id.; Lampone, supra note 26, at 1164. 
 182. Salazar, 2008 WL 5054108, at *6. 
 183. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). 
 184. See, e.g., Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 862 (11th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam); Amerifirst Bank v. TJX Cos. (In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig.), 564 F.3d 489, 492–93 
(1st Cir. 2009); Rivera v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 256, 263 (D.N.J. 2009); Falcon v. Philips 
Elec. N. Am. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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requirements of Rule 23 are analyzed, which often takes time and 
careful scrutiny, these courts contend jurisdiction before certification 
is limited.185 Federal courts may decide issues “touching on the 
merits of the case” but only until the courts decide certification.186  
 
c. “Filed Under” 
 
In contrast to scholars who interpreted CAFA’s use of the “filed 
under” language to mean jurisdiction continues, a later commentator 
analyzed the same terms and concluded they require the opposite.187 
He argued that the alternative conclusion misapplies CAFA’s plain 
language.188 In his view, such a conclusion misconstrues CAFA’s 
definition of both the term “class action” and the term “filed 
under.”189 He then offered three reasons the view that jurisdiction 
continues post-denial erroneously relies on the word “filed” in the 
phrase “filed under.”190 First, the word “filed” does not mean only 
“to file”; instead, it also means “on file.”191 He then demonstrated 
that focusing on the act of filing, rather than the existence of a case 
that remains on file with a court, is inconsistent with word choices 
Congress made in other places in the statute.192 For example, in a 
note regarding CAFA’s effective date, Congress used the word 
“commenced” to express that meaning of “to file,” which would 
properly “narrowly focus on the moment of filing.”193 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See, e.g., Rivera, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 263 (concluding CAFA grants “provisional jurisdiction to 
decide issues bearing on class certification prior to the entry of a class certification order”); Falcon, 489 
F. Supp. 2d at 368 (dismissing case where plaintiff’s counsel failed to proffer a suitable class 
representative, which rendered the case inappropriate for treatment as a class). Provisional is defined as 
“serving for the time being;” “temporary.” Provisional, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S LEARNER’S 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/provisional (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
 186. Rivera, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 271. 
 187. Lampone, supra note 26, at 1165. 
 188. Id. That the language is not “plain,” however is aptly illustrated when one compares the 
arguments of these two scholars who analyze the same language and explain it in ways that reasonably 
support conflicting interpretations. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (citing Filed, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003)). 
 192. Id. at 1167. 
 193. Lampone, supra note 26, at 1165–66 (citing Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
2, 119 Stat. 4, 14, while recognizing the existence of debate regarding the meaning of the word 
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use of certain language in one part of CAFA and the use of different 
language in another strongly suggests Congress intended different 
meanings.194 
Second, he pointed out that in several other places in CAFA, 
Congress used the phrase “originally filed” when referring to the act 
or moment of filing.195 Thus, the use of the word “filed” as used in 
the statute’s definition of “class action”196 without the word 
“originally” should be interpreted to mean something more than 
“originally filed.”197 It should mean an action is “on file” or is “still 
pending” as a class action before a court.198 Accordingly the 
argument is that CAFA’s grant of federal court jurisdiction for cases 
“filed under” Rule 23 or a similar state rule does not conflict with 
potentially problematic provisions that specify CAFA applies “before 
and after” a positive class certification decision because the phrase 
“filed under” should be interpreted to mean while a case continues to 
have status as a class action filed with a court.199 This interpretation 
persuasively illustrates how CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions, while 
sloppily drafted, can be interpreted in a way that avoids reading them 
to conflict with each other. The provisions can be read to each 
suggest jurisdiction continues only as long as a case is on file with 
the court as a class action. 
Finally, this commentator argued “CAFA’s reliance on Rule 23’s 
definition of a class action shows Congress did not intend for courts 
to measure jurisdiction solely at the instant of filing, but instead 
intended CAFA’s jurisdiction only to apply to a case that remains a 
class action filed under Rule 23.”200 To support the conclusion that 
until Rule 23’s prerequisites are met, a case in which class allegations 
                                                                                                                 
“commence,” citing, as an example, Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The “Commencement” Problem: 
Lessons from a Statute’s First Year, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 469, 474–509 (2006)). 
 194. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)). 
 195. Id. (citing, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), (3)(B), (3)(E), (4)(A)(i)(I), (4)(A)(i)(II)(cc), 
(4)(A)(i)(III) (2016)). 
 196. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (CAFA defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 
23 . . . or [a] similar State statute.”). 
 197. Lampone, supra note 26, at 1167–68. 
 198. Id. at 1165. 
 199. Id. at 1166. 
 200. Id. 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/4
2017] DUELING GRANTS 755 
are made is not a class action at all, he points to the Supreme Court’s 
declaration in Shady Grove that satisfying Rule 23’s requirements are 
“preconditions for maintaining a class action” and that “[t]he line 
between eligibility and certifiability is entirely artificial.”201 Thus, he 
argued CAFA’s incorporation of Rule 23 means “CAFA jurisdiction 
[is] not fully or properly invoked until certification.”202 To the extent 
this statement suggests a court’s exercise of jurisdiction under CAFA 
before the court decides class action is somehow not properly 
invoked, however, the statute makes clear that exercise of jurisdiction 
is proper as soon as a qualifying putative class is alleged.203 The 
existence of jurisdiction before a certification decision should be 
treated as a separate inquiry from the existence of jurisdiction after a 
class fails. 
d. Prudential Concerns 
Prudential concerns have also driven the decisions to hold that 
jurisdiction ends when a class fails. Indeed, cases in which courts 
have held they lack jurisdiction when they deny certification have 
tended to involve claims of questionable merit in which the 
underlying claims were relatively unsympathetic and involved little 
tangible injury.204 For example, in the Karhu case discussed earlier, 
the plaintiff alleged he had overpaid for dietary supplements that cost 
$23.34.205 After denying the plaintiff’s request for class treatment, 
the court noted that if the plaintiff had asserted this claim as an 
individual action seeking recovery in Florida’s state courts of general 
jurisdiction, he could not have satisfied the requisite amount-in-
controversy.206 Rather, the claim would have been consigned to 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. at 1169–70 (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1438 (2010)). 
 202. Id. at 1170. 
 203. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2016). 
 204. Examples include the alleged consumer classes in the Walewski and Karhu cases discussed 
above. Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857, 859 (11th Cir. 2012) (alleged overpayment 
of a video game); Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL 1274119, at *5 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2014) (alleged overpayment of a diet supplement). 
 205. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119, at *4. 
 206. Id. 
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small-claims court, which would have been better equipped to handle 
“such relatively minor disputes in an expedient, cost-effective 
manner.”207 Nevertheless, after the court denied class certification, 
the plaintiff sought to “move forward with a full-blown federal jury 
trial” and estimated the trial would take between a week and ten days 
and require testimony from numerous witnesses, including experts, 
which would have inflicted substantial costs in terms of time and 
expense on everyone involved.208 
Given these facts, the court warned, “the mere inclusion of class 
allegations into a pleading cannot form a basis for perpetual [federal] 
subject-matter jurisdiction over an action.”209 Allowing the remaining 
individual action to be litigated in federal courts would frustrate both 
CAFA’s goal of moving the nation’s largest class actions to federal 
courts and Rule 23’s goal of improving judicial economy and 
efficiency. In such cases, the court explained, courts “may exercise 
CAFA jurisdiction over a putative class action prior to making a class 
certification ruling—presuming the plaintiff has satisfied CAFA’s 
other jurisdictional prerequisites—or after granting certification in a 
class certification order.”210 But not after a court denies 
certification.211 Otherwise, the court reasoned, plaintiffs could 
include class allegations in complaints anytime they wished to avoid 
traditional jurisdictional requirements and pursue grievances, no 
matter how petty, in federal courts.212 When the possibility that a 
claim may qualify for class treatment ceases to exist, the 
justifications for continuing federal court jurisdiction also cease to 
exist. 
Turning to the argument that jurisdiction must continue after a 
denial of class certification to avoid conflict with the provisions of 
Rule 23 that allow courts to revisit certification decisions, courts that 
disagree frequently make clear in the dismissal or remand decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B), (d)(2), (d)(5), (B), (d)(8), (d)(1)(C) (2016)). 
 211. Karhu, 2014 WL 1274119, at *2. 
 212. Id. at *5. 
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that their prior decisions on class certification were final.213 That 
being the case, according to these courts, Rule 23’s authorization to 
revisit certification decisions does not weigh against dismissal or 
remand because there exists no reasonably foreseeable possibility 
that they might later reconsider class certification.214 Rather than 
analyzing the continuing jurisdiction issue in any great depth, 
however, these courts merely state jurisdiction is premised on cases 
being certified as class actions under CAFA and cannot exist where 
the premise no longer holds true.215 
B. Harmonizing Analysis 
In cases that reach a decision on certification, harmonizing 
CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions requires courts to consider 
jurisdiction at least twice during the litigation: once before the 
certification decision is rendered and another time after.216 Based on 
CAFA’s ordinary language, the legitimacy of jurisdiction before 
certification in no way depends on a court ultimately certifying a 
class.217 As long as a qualifying putative class action is alleged, 
CAFA confers subject matter jurisdiction at least until a court decides 
certification.218 When a class is certified, CAFA makes clear that 
jurisdiction continues.219 And when a certification request is denied, 
to avoid ignoring any of the provisions Congress chose to include in 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No. 07-1817, 2009 WL 1703224, at *2 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) 
(citing Muehlbauer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05 C 2676, 2009 WL 874511, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
31, 2009); Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., No. 07–cv–0064, 2008 WL 5054108, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 
20, 2008); Jones v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., No. 07–22328–CIV, 2008 WL 4541016, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 
2008); Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Arabian v. Sony 
Elecs. Inc., No. 05CV1741, 2007 WL 2701340, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007)); cf. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(8) (2016) (providing for jurisdiction “before . . . the entry of a class certification order”)). 
 214. Avritt, 2009 WL 1703224, at *2. 
 215. Id.; Lampone, supra note 26, at 1161. 
 216. Lampone, supra note 26, at 1170. In cases where certification is denied, courts may need to 
consider jurisdiction under CAFA more than twice. See id. For example, a court may initially certify a 
class and later exercise its discretion to decertify it. Were that to happen, jurisdiction would be 
considered when the case was filed, when the court certified the class, and again when the court 
decertified the class. 
 217. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 218. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
 219. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
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the statute,220 this article suggests jurisdiction ceases. Because 
Congress intended to allow the largest, nationwide class actions to be 
tried in federal courts, and because Rule 23 authorizes courts to 
reconsider class action decisions until final judgment, however, 
courts should consider the likelihood that cases might later qualify 
for class treatment before deciding certification.221 They may 
accomplish this task by seeking briefing on whether apparent class 
deficiencies might be remedied before reaching a decision on 
certification.222 Once a court denies certification, however, it should 
remand or dismiss the individual claims unless they independently 
meet the jurisdictional requirements to be in federal court. 
1. Dismissal or Remand is Suggested 
Reading the statute’s jurisdictional provisions together suggests 
jurisdiction should end when a class fails. The definition of “class 
certification order” in the statute expressly includes an order 
approving class treatment.223 It does not, however, include an order 
denying class treatment.224 Thus, in addition to the reasons identified 
earlier, the standard axiom of statutory interpretation “expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius”—the expression of one thing excludes the 
other225—suggests CAFA jurisdiction does not continue after a denial 
of class certification. Because Congress set forth one situation in 
which jurisdiction would continue—where at least partial class 
treatment is approved—but did not include the other way—where 
class treatment is denied as to all aspects of the case—this choice 
suggests Congress intended jurisdiction to end after a denial of class 
certification.226 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 221. See Wasserman, supra note 28, at 841. 
 222. See id. at 855 (comparing situations in which class deficiencies may be remedied with ones in 
which the deficiencies are inherent in the class). 
 223. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(1)(C). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Watt v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 457 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 226. See Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No. CIV 07-1817, 2009 WL 1703224, at *2 (D. Minn. June 
18, 2009) (citing Watt v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 457 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.2006)). 
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In addition, considering CAFA’s jurisdictional statutory scheme as 
a whole leads to the same conclusion. Reading “before or after” and 
“entry of a class certification” in a way that avoids rendering these 
provisions redundant or superfluous suggests jurisdiction ends after a 
class fails. While some have contended this language serves merely 
to make clear jurisdiction is not dependent on a grant of certification, 
such an interpretation would render these provisions redundant 
partial restatements of what the statute already provides.227 Statutes 
should be construed in ways that “avoid a statutory construction that 
would render another part of the same statute superfluous.”228 
Likewise, courts should avoid interpretations that render some words 
redundant.229 The statute already plainly provides that jurisdiction 
exists as soon as a qualifying alleged class action is filed, and that 
jurisdiction continues at least until a certification decision is 
reached.230 Thus, there is no need for the “before and after” language 
to make these directives clearer. 
Furthermore, the attempt to rationalize the statute’s “before or 
after” and “class certification order” provisions by suggesting 
Congress intended these provisions to operate to allow putative class 
actions to be removed for the first time after a class certification 
order is signed would likely conflict with the statute’s removal 
provisions in the vast majority of cases. CAFA’s removal provision 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). 
 228. See United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 300 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir.2002) (“[C]ourts avoid a 
statutory construction that would render another part of the same statute superfluous.”). 
 229. U.S. v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997); Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 
152 (1883); see also Avritt, 2009 WL 1703224, at *2 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) (citing U.S. v. Stanko, 
491 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007)). On the other hand, the argument that jurisdiction under CAFA 
should not continue after a class fails because section 1332(d)(2) merely authorizes a court to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction by deciding whether the alleged class qualifies for Rule 23 treatment is 
unconvincing for a similar reason as it would render the whole of section 1332(d)(2) superfluous. It is 
well established that federal courts always have jurisdiction to determine whether they have jurisdiction. 
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 95–96 (2d ed. 2011) 
(citations omitted). Indeed, whenever a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, courts must 
have authority to decide whether the challenge is valid and thus must consider whether it may properly 
exercise jurisdiction over the case. U.S. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1947). 
Thus reading section 1332(d)(2) to mean so little would render this jurisdictional grant redundant of the 
power federal courts already exercise. 
 230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2016). 
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incorporates most aspects of the general removal statute.231 CAFA 
provides: 
A class action may be removed to a district court of the 
United States in accordance with section 1446 [the general 
removal statute] (except that the 1-year limitation under 
section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply), without regard to 
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the 
action is brought, except that such action may be removed 
by any defendant without the consent of all defendants.232 
The general removal provision set forth in section 1446(b)(1) 
provides, “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding 
shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant . . . of 
a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon 
which such action or proceeding is based . . . .”233 Presumably, a 
court could not certify a class action in the absence of any class 
allegations having been made.234 Therefore, when class treatment is 
alleged, the latest that allegation could be raised would be 
simultaneously with the certification decision, after which, the 
defendant would have thirty days to remove the action to federal 
court.235 Thus, an argument that the “before and after” and “class 
certification” order reflects Congress’s intention to allow removal for 
                                                                                                                 
 231. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2016). 
 232. 28 U.S.C. § 1453. 
 233. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2016). 
 234. While much was made at the time of CAFA’s passage of the “phenomenon of ‘drive-by class 
certification’” and “judicial hellholes,” presumably, even in those courts, class allegations could not 
have come for the first time after the class was certified. See Purcell, supra note 9, at 1872, 1886 n.249. 
Perhaps it is not impossible to imagine a situation in which a class certification could make an action 
that had not been removable at one point become removable later under the statute. For example, 
imagine a situation in which a qualifying putative class is filed in state court, then removed to federal 
court under CAFA. The federal court then denied certification and remanded the case to state court. 
Logically, at that point, the case could still contain the kinds of class allegations covered by CAFA, but 
the case would not be removable as it had just been remanded. But if the state court later certified the 
class action, that class certification decision could operate to render the case removable again under 
CAFA’s removal provision. 
 235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
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the first time after a class certification order is signed is fairly 
unpersuasive. 
2. Reliance on Diversity Statute is Misplaced 
For several reasons, reliance on the statute’s placement in the 
diversity statute is misplaced. The argument that CAFA’s placement 
in the general diversity statute means Congress intended courts to 
exercise CAFA jurisdiction the same way courts exercise general 
diversity jurisdiction is contradicted in at least two ways. First, the 
idea that by placing CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions in the general 
diversity statute, Congress intended courts in these putative class 
actions to assess jurisdictional facts only at one time during a case—
at the time of filing or removal—is undermined by the fact that when 
Congress intended this result, it said so.236 Consider the following 
provision in CAFA: 
Citizenship of the members of the proposed plaintiff classes 
shall be determined for purposes of paragraphs (2) through 
(6) as of the date of the filing of the complaint or amended 
complaint, or, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not 
subject to Federal jurisdiction, as of the date of service by 
plaintiffs of an amended pleading, motion, or other paper, 
indicating the existence of Federal jurisdiction.237 
Where Congress intended jurisdictional facts to be assessed by 
reference to one specific point in time in a lawsuit, it made that 
intention explicit.238 In addition, the quoted provision uses the same 
rule on timing to determine citizenship under CAFA as is used in 
determining citizenship under the general diversity statute.239 If 
Congress intended all of the accepted rules that have developed under 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7) (2016) (expressly providing several times during which jurisdictional 
facts may be assessed). 
 237. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7). 
 238. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
 239. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7). 
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the general diversity statute, there would exist no need to single out 
this one. 
This reasoning applies equally to the warnings that if jurisdiction 
fails at any point in the litigation, jurisdiction will be considered to 
have been flawed from the beginning.240 Applying this accepted, 
nearly black letter rule from the general diversity statute, some have 
argued if jurisdiction could be found lacking after a class fails, then 
in the time before the certification decision, “jurisdiction would 
neither exist nor not exist,” and the action “would float in some kind 
of suspended animation.”241 CAFA’s ordinary language, however, 
refutes this argument because it makes clear jurisdiction exists before 
a certification decision.242 The relevant part of the statute states, 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action in which the matter . . . is a class action” and defines a “class 
action” as “any civil action filed under rule 23 . . . or similar State 
statute.”243 Congress thus defined the term “class action” in a way 
that explicitly includes “any civil action filed” as the kind of putative 
class action contemplated by the statute.244 That this language 
operates to confer jurisdiction on federal courts as soon as plaintiffs 
file a qualifying putative class action is supported by logic because, 
again, class actions cannot be certified before they are alleged.245 
Moreover, the very provisions in CAFA that create confusion after a 
court denies a certification request prove that Congress intended 
federal courts to have jurisdiction before a certification decision is 
reached. Those provisions state CAFA applies “to any class action 
before or after the entry of a class certification order” with “class 
certification order” defined as an order approving at least some 
aspects of the case for class treatment.246 Before the court decides 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Calvillo v. Siouxland Urology Assocs. P.C., No. CIV. 09–4051–KES, 2011 WL 5155093, at *5 
(D.S.D. Oct. 28, 2011). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). 
 243. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B), (d)(2). 
 244. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
 245. See infra Part II.A. 
 246. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C), (d)(8). 
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certification, it cannot enter a class certification order.247 Any 
expressed concern that interpreting jurisdiction to expire after a class 
fails would render earlier rulings on discovery and other motions 
moot is, therefore, misplaced. 
3. Relevant Policies Are Not Undermined 
Dismissal or remand in cases where class certification fails is 
consistent with CAFA and Rule 23’s purposes. CAFA was meant, in 
part, to prevent “a parade of abuses” by plaintiffs who choose to file 
class actions in states they consider most likely to render favorable 
certification decisions.248 Relying on that policy to conclude 
jurisdiction must continue after a court denies certification, however, 
ignores the reality that plaintiffs do not control that decision, which 
means this situation would present fewer opportunities for abuse. The 
concern about forum abuse also ignores that continuing jurisdiction 
in every case provides another, albeit different, opportunity for 
abuse.249 The Karhu and Walewski cases illustrate situations in which 
plaintiffs could seek to keep the smallest claims in federal courts 
merely by alleging a qualifying putative class action.250 Judicial 
economy weighs against continuing jurisdiction in these situations. 
The statute already requires federal courts to spend effort, even if the 
court dismisses the class allegations at the pleadings stage.251 It thus 
already burdens courts with its very broad expansion of federal 
jurisdiction; its effects should not also be expanded to require federal 
courts to spend additional resources, including in some cases trying 
these cases in their entirety, after they cease to have even a 
possibility of qualifying as a class action. While costs will likely 
deter most plaintiffs from stubbornly continuing to pursue their 
individual actions in federal court after their class allegations fail, 
exceptions exist. Continuing jurisdiction in these kinds of cases 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 248. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, supra note 51, at 6. 
 249. See, e.g., Walewski v. Zenimax Media, Inc., 502 F. App’x 857 (11th Cir. 2012); Karhu v. Vital 
Pharmaceuticals, No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL 1274119 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2014). 
 250. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 251. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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would provide plaintiffs the opportunity to force federal courts to try 
cases that would not otherwise even satisfy the comparatively 
generous standards for subject matter jurisdiction in state courts. 
The idea that not allowing jurisdiction to continue after a denial of 
certification would be inefficient and give plaintiffs more 
opportunities to engage in forum shopping and treat litigation as a 
“ping-pong match” is somewhat convincing, but not enough to justify 
continuing jurisdiction after a class fails. For context, consider what a 
potential litigation “ping-pong match” might look like. When a 
plaintiff files a qualifying putative class action in state court, the 
defendants could remove the case to federal court.252 If jurisdiction 
ended when the class failed, the case would be remanded to state 
court, where it could be certified as a class action.253 Although one 
may question whether a state court would certify a class action after a 
federal court denied class treatment, it could.254 The state’s class 
certification rules would likely be more generous than Rule 23’s 
requirements.255 In addition, recent Supreme Court precedents 
concerning the preclusive effect of a denial of class certification and 
the ability of named plaintiffs to stipulate away rights of absent class 
members suggest a state court could certify a nationwide class if it 
chose to do so.256 CAFA’s provisions suggest if a state court were to 
certify the class, the defendants would have the opportunity again to 
remove the action back to the federal court that earlier rejected class 
treatment.257 The federal court would then have to apply Rule 23 to 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Jodi Kleinick & Mor Wetzler, Removability of Federal Class Action Claims from State Court, 
N.Y.L.J. Apr. 11, 2013. 
 253. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2016) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 
 254. See, e.g., Puckett v. City of Emmett, 747 P.2d 48 (Idaho 1987). 
 255. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 311–12 (2011) (rejecting injunction against state 
court’s consideration of nearly identical class because state law rules on certification could differ from 
Rule 23). 
 256. See id. at 316 (acknowledging danger that class counsel could repeatedly attempt to certify the 
same class to force defendants to settle but nevertheless rejecting injunction against state court’s 
consideration of nearly identical class); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1348–49 
(2013) (rejecting class plaintiff’s stipulation that neither he nor class would seek damages in excess of 
$5 million because plaintiff could not bind absent class members before certification). 
 257. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(c), (d)(8) (2016). 
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determine whether class treatment could be allowed.258 Since federal 
courts retain the authority to revisit class certification decisions until 
final judgment, the federal court could decertify the class again.259 In 
doing so, the court would again lose jurisdiction and have to remand 
the case to state court, where the process theoretically could be 
repeated.260 
Although the danger of rendering litigation a game of 
jurisdictional ping-pong exists, the worry about inefficient, serial 
litigation is not a new one, nor is it particularly likely to play out in 
CAFA cases because of the likely obstacles to continuing to pursue 
litigation after a class fails.261 Take, for example, a situation in which 
plaintiffs file their claims in federal courts pursuant to CAFA. 
Certification decisions generally take time, and plaintiffs’ individual 
claims would be dismissed after a class fails.262 In that situation, 
plaintiffs will likely encounter statute of limitations problems, 
particularly if the cases began in federal rather than state courts. In 
federal courts, class action tolling operates to toll the statute of 
limitations for absent class members’ individual claims in all federal 
courts while a class action is pending.263 If plaintiff’s individual 
action was dismissed, however, plaintiff would have to assert some 
other basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction that would allow 
plaintiff to file the individual action in federal court with the 
guarantee that class action tolling would apply.264 If no independent 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 393 (2010). 
 259. Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 260. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2016). 
 261. See, e.g., Tanya Pierce, Improving Predictability and Consistency in Class Action Tolling, 23 
GEO. MASON L. Rev. 339, 347 (2016). 
 262. Richardson, supra note 25, at 126. 
 263. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983) (extending American Pipe tolling 
to putative class members’ later-filed individual actions); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 
538, 553–54 (1974) (holding that attempted intervenors claims were not time-barred). American Pipe 
tolling is intended to prevent duplicative litigation that would result if plaintiffs had to intervene or file 
independent lawsuits to protect their interests while the class action was pending. Crown, Cork & Seal 
Co., 462 U.S. at 351; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553–54. Thus it is consistent with the efficiency concerns 
underlying both CAFA and Rule 23. While the operation of class action tolling in later-filed individual 
actions is straightforward, in other scenarios, such as in cross-jurisdictional tolling situations, its 
operation is less certain. Pierce, supra note 261, at 339 (citing e.g., Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 
247 P.3d 244, 252 (Mont. 2010)). 
 264. See Pierce, supra note 261, at 347. 
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basis for federal jurisdiction existed and if the limitations period had 
already passed, cross-jurisdictional tolling would have to apply to 
save plaintiff’s claim, but few states allow this kind of tolling.265 
Without class action tolling to save limitations, plaintiffs whose 
limitations periods expired while courts were considering 
certification, could not successfully pursue successive litigation. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not found efficiency 
arguments particularly compelling in other contexts, especially when 
weighed against the interests of federalism inherent in our parallel 
state and federal court systems.266 For example, in the Smith v. Bayer 
case, which dealt with whether a federal court could properly enjoin a 
state court in a parallel action from certifying an alleged class that 
was nearly identical to one earlier rejected by a federal court, the 
Court recognized that these policy concerns arise with the use of the 
class action device.267 It acknowledged the theoretical danger that 
class counsel could repeatedly attempt to certify the same class, thus 
effectively forcing defendants to settle.268 The Court also noted the 
Seventh Circuit’s earlier objection “to an ‘an asymmetric system in 
which class counsel can win but never lose’ because of their ability to 
relitigate the issue of certification.”269 But, the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that when it had earlier confronted a similar problem in 
Taylor v. Sturgell, no such serial relitigation came to pass.270 
In addition, dismissal or remand in cases where class certification 
fails is consistent with CAFA’s purpose of moving the nation’s 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See, e.g., Vincent v. Money Store, 915 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561, 56970 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The 
plaintiffs cannot rely on American Pipe to toll the statutes of limitations for their state law claims. The 
plaintiffs must look to any state analogue to American Pipe tolling rather than American Pipe itself.”). 
Cross-jurisdictional tolling refers to situations in which class actions are filed in a jurisdiction other than 
the one in which plaintiff seeks to have the limitations period tolled. Id. at 569–70 (citing e.g., Patterson 
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 116, 122–23 (D.R.I. 2012); Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. 
Corp., 247 P.3d 244, 254 (Mont. 2010). 
 266. See Pierce, supra note 261, at 369. 
 267. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 302 (2011). 
 268. Id. at 316 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 47–48, Bayer, 564 U.S. 299 (No. 09-1205)). 
 269. Id. (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 270. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 316–17 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)). That does not mean, 
however, that these decisions are above persuasive criticism. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling 
Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 577, 584–85 (2011). But they are the law. 
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largest class actions to federal court. Despite the possibility that 
plaintiffs could seek to have state courts certify class actions after 
federal courts deny them, realistically when class actions fail, they 
now pose little continuing threat of becoming the kind of large 
nationwide class action, with the potential ramifications on 
businesses and interstate commerce that CAFA sought to avoid.271 If 
federal courts were to continue to exercise jurisdiction indefinitely in 
these kinds of cases, CAFA would infringe upon the jurisdiction of 
state courts even more than it already clearly does. Such an 
interpretation would present an affront to federalism that otherwise 
could be avoided. Furthermore, interpreting jurisdiction to continue 
after a court decides a class does not and never will qualify for class 
treatment would further diminish limits the Supreme Court has 
historically placed on federal courts’ ability to extend their 
“protective jurisdiction.”272 Indeed, as a scholar recently noted, by 
incorporating a minimal diversity requirement in CAFA, “Congress 
accomplished through CAFA much of what it previously declined to 
do with a proposed grant of protective jurisdiction. If the [Supreme] 
Court’s limits on protective jurisdiction are to remain meaningful, the 
Court must explore ways of reigning in the broadest forms of 
minimal diversity.”273 
Finally, if CAFA jurisdiction were interpreted to attach 
permanently, such that later events could not divest that jurisdiction, 
Article III’s limits and Congress’s authorization of federal judicial 
authority could be exceeded.274 If a denial of certification is final, all 
that is left before the court is an individual action. In individual 
actions that rely on diversity jurisdiction, complete diversity between 
                                                                                                                 
 271. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) (2016) and other sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 272. Pfander, supra note 34, at 1448. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (authorizing judicial authority for federal court over nine categories 
of cases); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845) (finding judicial power of federal courts dependent on 
Congress’s actions to invest such courts with jurisdiction). But see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Judicial 
Power and the Inferior Federal Courts: Exploring the Constitutional Vesting Thesis, 46 GA. L. REV. 1, 
46 (2011) (arguing that while the accepted view that Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts “is of ancient lineage, the proposition has never satisfactorily been established by the 
[Supreme] Court”). 
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parties must exist.275 If the action is in federal court solely by virtue 
of the minimal diversity requirement in CAFA, however, it follows 
that complete diversity between the named plaintiff and the 
defendants likely would not exist.276 And, in situations where 
complete diversity did exist, if plaintiff earlier had to rely solely on 
CAFA for federal subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff would likely 
have depended on the statute’s aggregation of class members’ claims 
to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.277 The general 
diversity statute, on the other hand, requires at least one plaintiff to 
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.278 In situations where 
it is clear to a legal certainty no plaintiff’s claim could exceed 
$75,000, the general diversity statute would not be satisfied.279 And 
while additional plaintiffs may sometimes rely on another plaintiff’s 
damages to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement,280 no such 
authority exists in this situation to relax the complete diversity 
requirement after a class action fails. 
CONCLUSION 
“[A]ll informed observers of the litigation process . . . understand 
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and state class action rules, 
although regulating the process of litigation, can still have a major 
substantive impact.”281 That fact is especially salient in cases that 
make their way to federal court via CAFA. Scholars and courts have 
disagreed on whether jurisdiction should continue under the statute 
after a court denies a class certification request.282 Some have 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1807) (affirming dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction, 
interpreting the Judiciary Act of 1789 to require complete diversity of citizenship); see also Dodson & 
Pucillo, supra note 119 (citing 13 E. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3605 (3d ed. 2014); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1424 (7th ed. 2015)). 
 276. Pierce, supra note 46 at 40. 
 277. Dodson & Pucillo, supra note 119 at 1334. 
 278. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2016); see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 
(2005). 
 279. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
 280. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 566. 
 281. Burbank, supra note 33, at 1442. 
 282. See supra Section III.A. 
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concluded CAFA’s grant of federal subject matter continues after 
certification only if a class is certified.283 Others have held the 
opposite.284 This article critiques each side, as well as the various 
rationales on which they rely. Then, despite some identified, possible 
negative effects, it suggests CAFA’s statutory scheme and relevant 
policies support the conclusion that CAFA’s jurisdiction expires at 
the failure of class certification. 
For the most part, this interpretation does not conflict with or 
undermine the purposes underlying CAFA or Rule 23. Considering 
CAFA jurisdiction before and after a certification decision means 
federal courts have jurisdiction over the nation’s largest putative 
class actions as soon as they are alleged. That original jurisdictional 
grant reduces incentives to forum shop because federal court 
jurisdiction before a certification decision is not dependent on class 
treatment being granted. Indeed, that jurisdiction, along with all of its 
accompanying consequences, continues until a class action fails.285 
At that point, however, the case can no longer be a nationwide class 
action, so the concerns underlying CAFA jurisdiction are no longer 
implicated.286 Thus, discontinuing jurisdiction is appropriate. In cases 
where the class deficiency may be remedied, however, the efficiency 
concerns underlying both CAFA and Rule 23 suggest courts should 
carefully consider the likelihood that a class could later be 
certified.287 If the case has the potential of becoming the kind of 
nationwide class CAFA intended be litigated in federal court, a court 
should seek additional information and allow attempts to remediate 
the class before it decides certification. 
This approach furthers Congress’s articulated intention to allow 
class actions of national importance to be heard in federal courts, but 
does not interpret that intention to mean every case that ever 
qualified for jurisdiction under the statute should remain in federal 
                                                                                                                 
 283. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 284. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 285. Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 13-60768-CIV, 2014 WL 1274119, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 27, 2014). 
 286. Id. at *4. 
 287. See Wasserman, supra note 28, at 855. 
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courts forever.288 While theoretically possible, allowing CAFA 
jurisdiction to lapse is not likely to lead to the parade of horribles 
some courts have used to rationalize their conclusions that CAFA 
subject matter jurisdiction continues no matter what. Allowing 
plaintiffs’ inclusion of class allegations to irrevocably vest federal 
courts with subject matter jurisdiction would burden the federal court 
system in ways even greater than CAFA necessarily does and would 
present an unnecessary, further affront to federalism than is caused 
by the proposed interpretation of continuing jurisdiction under 
CAFA. Reading CAFA in the way this article proposes would give 
meaning to all of its provisions, while also recognizing its limitations 
and avoid many of the identified problems that would otherwise 
result. 
                                                                                                                 
 288. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2) (2016)). 
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